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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

:

WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON,

:

Case No. 880612-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction for theft, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from district courts
in criminal cases not involving a conviction of a first degree or
capital felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp.
1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether defendant waived his Fifth Amendment right

against self-incrimination so that his statements to police were
properly admitted by the trial court.
2.

Whether the trial court was correct is denying

defendant's motion for dismissal after a police officer testified
regarding an oral statement made by defendant which was not
disclosed to defense counsel prior to trial.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
For purposes of this brief, the State relies on the
following provisions:
1.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978),

2.

U.S. Const, amends. V and VI,

3.

Utah R. Crim. P. 16,

4.

Utah R. Crim. P. 30.

Copies of these provisions are attached in the
Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 11, 1988, defendant was charged with theft, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
(1978) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 21-22).

Defendant filed a

motion to suppress his pre-charging statements and a hearing was
held on that motion (R. at 26-28).

After the hearing and further

investigation by the court of proceedings in the circuit court,
the motion was denied (R. at 30-36).
This case was tried to a jury on August 11-12, 1988, in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, presiding (R. at 39-41).
After deliberation, the jury convicted defendant of theft, a
class A misdemeanor, a lesser included offense of the original
charge (R. at 90). On September 27, 1988, defendant was
sentenced to a term of 12 months in the Salt Lake County Jail but
the sentence was stayed and defendant placed on probation for a
period of 18 months under certain conditions (R. at 111-12).
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on September 29, 1988 (R. at
98).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant and the victim, Dale Mitchley, had been
friends for ten to twelve years (R. 123 at 10-11).

During the

course of their friendshipf defendant had worked for Mitchley and
even lived at his home for a period of time when he had needed a
place to stay (R. 123 at 11-12 and 23). Mitchley is a long-haul
trucker and allowed defendant to stay in his home to watch it and
once hired defendant to drive a truck for him (R. 123 at 12 and
24).
In February of 1988, while Mitchley was driving his
truck in the Midwest, he developed mechanical difficulties and
called his neighbor, Ben Chapman, for assistance (R. 123 at 13).
Mitchley asked Chapman to contact defendant and get his help in
preparing an engine for transportation to Wisconsin to repair the
truck Mitchley was driving (R. 123 at 13-14 and 51). Chapman
contacted defendant and the two of them did the requested work
(R. 123 at 51).
A day or two after the work was done, Chapman went back
to Mitchley's house and found the garage door ajar (R. 123 at
51).

Chapman checked and found an air compressor missing (R. 123

at 51) and reported its loss to Mitchley (R. 123 at 15).
Mitchley testified that he had not given anyone permission to
take the compressor (R. 123 at 17).
About one to two weeks after the theft was reported,
Mitchley spoke by telephone with defendant and asked him if he
knew anything about the compressor.
did not (R. 123 at 20-21).

Defendant answered that he

Shortly before the preliminary

hearing in this matter, defendant approached Mitchley on the
street and told him that defendant had not taken the compressor
but that he knew who had (R. 123 at 22).
Around midnight on April 5-6, 1988, defendant was
arrested when a burglar alarm sounded at Edison School (R. 122 at
2-3).

Detective Brent Hutchison interrogated defendant about

that burglary in the early morning hours of April 6 (R. 122 at
3).

Defendant was fully advised of his right to counsel in the

context of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
pursuant to the Miranda decision (R. 122 at 4).

When defendant

and Detective Hutchison had discussed the Edison School incident,
the detective asked defendant if there were any other "crimes or
situations he wanted to talk about, possibly get cleared up." (R.
122 at 6). Defendant told Hutchison that he knew about a stolen
compressor out of Murray, that Detective Christensen from Murray
was working on the case, and that Dale Mitchley was the victim
(R. 122 at 7 and 11). Defendant told Hutchison that another
person had taken the compressor but that defendant would give
information on the theft (R. 122 at 11). Defendant also said
that he was willing to speak with Detective Christensen about the
theft (R. 122 at 7) .
On April 7, 1988, Detective Hutchison and Detective
Christensen went to the jail and spoke with defendant (R. 122 at
9 and 12 and R. 123 at 59). Detective Hutchison again advised
defendant of his rights under the Miranda decision (R. 122 at 9
and R. 123 at 59). As at the earlier interrogation, defendant
said that he understood those rights and wished to speak with the

officers (R. 122 at 5-6 and 9-10).

Defendant never asked that

questioning cease, nor did he ever indicate that he wanted
counsel present (R. 122 at 10). During this second questioning,
Detective Christensen explained that he was there at defendant's
request and defendant admitted that he had taken the compressor
(R. 123 at 59-60 and 100-101).

Defendant said that he had sold

or traded it to someone named Paul and eventually helped
Detective Christensen locate the compressor and retrieve it.

He

also said that he had worked alone in stealing the compressor (R.
123 at 60-65).

At a later conversation between defendant and

Christensen, defendant denied that he had taken the compressor
(R. 123 at 63). On April 27th, defendant went to the Murray
Police Station and told Detective Christensen where to find the
compressor and then denied that he had taken it (R. 123 at 63).
At that point, defendant claimed that Paul Larson was responsible
for taking the compressor, but that he had helped plan the theft
(R. 123 at 64). No written report of this April 27th
conversation was made and the conversation was not reported to
the prosecutor until the morning of trial (R. 123 at 68 and 77).
Charges on the Edison School case were filed April 8,
1988, and charges on the theft of the air compressor were filed
on April 13, 1988 (R. 122 at 8 and 13 and R. at 34). There was
some confusion about when counsel was appointed for defendant.
When defense counsel questioned Detective Hutchison at the
suppression hearing, he spoke of the second interrogation which
occurred on April 7.

He asked the detective, "Sometime prior to

engaging in these discussions to talking about the crimes, he

[defendant] indicated to you that he had been to court; isn't
that true?"

To this, the detective answered, MI believe so." (R.

122 at 4). Detective Hutchison continued to answer defense
counsel's leading questions as if counsel had been appointed
prior to the questioning on April 7th (R. 122 at 5). Detective
Christensen was not called to testify at the suppression hearing
but did testify at trial concerning that second questioning.
Detective Christensen said that he was present during the time
Detective Hutchison gave defendant his Miranda warnings and that
defendant had not said anything about counsel having been
appointed in Christensen's presence (R. 123 at 66). Neither had
Detective Hutchison ever told him that defendant had said that
counsel might have been appointed; the first time Christensen
heard that defendant may have made that statement was at the
suppression hearing (R. 123 at 66).
A jailor who was present at the suppression hearing
testified as to the procedures followed for persons, such as
defendant, who were in custody but not formally charged (R. 122
at 20-31).

Evidently, a first appearance or probable cause

hearing is held as soon as possible after arrest to allow a
magistrate to set bail or conditions of release (R. 122 at 20).
Counsel is not usually appointed at this hearing but may be
appointed at a later hearing, after formal charges are filed (R.
122 at 23-25).

The jailor testified that different judges may

have a different procedure regarding whether counsel is appointed
at that probable cause hearing, but that Judge Gowans (who
evidently conducted the probable cause hearing for defendant)
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does not appoint counsel at that initial hearing (R. 122 at 30-31
and 37).
Based on the testimony introduced at the suppression
hearing, Judge Russon asked counsel to provide a transcript of
the probable cause hearing and the file from the Edison School
burglary case to him for a determination as to whether counsel
was appointed at the initial hearing (R. 122 at 37-38).

After

reviewing the file, Judge Russon found:
A review of State v. Christofferson, CR88-652, the school burglary case, the Court
file indicates that the Complaint was filed
on April 8, 1988, and a Summons dated that
date of the warrant of arrest. The defendant
appeared without counsel for arraignment in
Circuit Curt [sic] on April 11, 1988, at
which time the court appointed the Legal
Defenders office to represent the defendant.

The Court recognizes that the detective
who interrogated the defendant testified that
on April 7, the defendant informed him he had
been to court and an attorney had been
appointed who he had not yet seen. This
could not have possibly happened, since the
court records indicate clearly that neither
case was filed at the time of or prior to
April 7, and the defendant made no court
appearance according to the files until April
11. The Court in this decision relies upon
the accuracy of the official court files.
(R. at 34-35) (emphasis in original).
Defendant took the stand at trial and testified that he
had taken the compressor but that he felt Mitchley owed him money
and therefore he was justified in taking it (R. 123 at 84-85).
He had never informed other witnesses of this claim until trial
(R. 123 at 22-23, 49, and 60-61).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Since formal charges had not yet been filed against
defendant at the time of the April 7 interrogation, a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached.

Defendant's

right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, and
its attendant right to counsel under Miranda, was implicated
because defendant was in custody.

Defendant was fully advised of

his Miranda rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived the right
to have counsel present during questioning.

The trial court

found that a hearing at which counsel could have been appointed
never occurred prior to the April 7 interrogation, and this
finding is not clearly erroneous.

If the hearing did occur,

defendant's mere presence would not have been an invocation of
the right to have counsel present at subsequent questioning, and
there is nothing in the record to support a finding that
defendant asked for counsel at such a pre-interrogation hearing.
There is no evidence that defendant ever expressly
invoked his right to have counsel present and his statement that
counsel may have been appointed was not an equivocal invocation
of that right.

Even if defendant's statement is construed as an

equivocal invocation, the statement was made before the Miranda
admonition was given and that admonition served as a stronger
clarification than any other questions could have.

The statement

was not coerced and was properly admitted as voluntary.
Defendant waived any right to appeal the issue of an
alleged discovery violation when he failed to object to the
introduction of defendant's April 27 oral statement.

Neither did

defendant seek a just and appropriate remedy when he asked for a
dismissal of the charges as a remedy for the alleged violation.
Even if the nondisclosure of the April 27 statement
were a discovery violation, it was harmless error.

Given all of

the defendant's statements to the victim and to the detectives,
that oral statement was not credible and disclosure of the
statement before trial would not have changed the outcome of
trial.

Defendant has not made a credible argument that

nondisclosure impaired his defense and has not shown a reasonable
likelihood of a different result at trial had disclosure of that
statement occurred.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AT THE TIME OF DEFENDANT'S INTERROGATION, HIS
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL HAD NOT
ATTACHED. DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO
COUNSEL UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND HIS
CONFESSION WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL.
Defendant argues that the trial court should have
suppressed his statement of April 7 because he had not waived his
right to have counsel present when the statement was given.

In

making that argument, he does not appear to dispute the trial
court's conclusion that, because formal charges on either case
had not been filed as of April 7, the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel had not yet attached.

In line with this apparent

concession, defendant offers no Sixth Amendment analysis of the
suppression issue.

Rather, he focuses on the questions of

whether, at the time the statement was elicited by the police, he
had invoked or waived his Fifth Amendment right to have counsel

present during custodial interrogation.

Accordingly, the State

will limit its response to an analysis of those issues under the
Fifth Amendment, recognizing that reference to the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is neither pertinent nor necessary to
their resolution.
A.

Standard of Review for Trial Court's Decision
Regarding Suppression of Evidence.

Utah appellate courts have delineated a "clearly
erroneous" standard when reviewing the decisions of trial courts
on motions to suppress evidence.

This Court, in State v.

Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1988), said:
When reviewing a trial court's factual
assessments underlying a decision to grant or
deny a suppression motion, this Court will
not disturb the court's determination unless
the trial court was clearly in error. State
v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987). A trial
court's determination is clearly erroneous
if, upon review of the totality of the facts
and circumstances, we reach a firm and
definite conviction that a mistake has been
made. ^d. at 1258; State v. Hegelman, 717
P.2d 1348 (Utah 1986).
754 P.2d at 968.

This Court, then, should affirm defendant's

conviction because the trial court's factual determinations in
this matter were correct.

As will be set out below, the totality

of the circumstances demonstrates that the trial court did not
err in its decision to admit defendant's admissions at trial.
B.

Defendant Did Not Expressly Invoke His Right to
Have Counsel Present During Interrogation.

Defendant first claims that he invoked his right to
counsel when he appeared at a probable cause hearing.

He admits

that the trial court found that this hearing could not have
occurred but states that this finding is clearly erroneous.
_i n_

He

asserts that, "The Edison School file, relied upon by the judge,
may well not have been created until charges were filed on April
8.

Probable cause hearings, although routinely held the day

after arrest, may not be noted in files." (Br. of App. at 11).
There is nothing in the record to support this assertion and
defendant's request that this Court accept this statement as fact
without record support is contrary to the standards of appellate
review.

State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986).
Contrary to defendant's recitation of the testimony,

the officers did not testify that they "had the impression Mr.
Christofferson appeared in court and a lawyer was appointed; . .
." (Br. of App. at 11). Only one detective testified and his
testimony was that defendant told him that he [defendant] thought
that counsel had been appointed (R. 122 at 14). Nor did the
transportation officer testify that "he would have taken the
defendant to court the day after his arrest." (Br. of App. at
11).

Officer Probert testified that the normal procedure was to

take arrested individuals before the magistrate the next morning
for a probable cause hearing and setting of bond (R. 122 at 20).
The officer specifically said that he had no idea if he was
present on April 6 when defendant might have been taken before
the magistrate (R. 122 at 28-29).

Not knowing if he was present

on April 6, he did not know whether defendant was appointed
counsel on that day (R. 122 at 29).
With that information before it, the trial court took
the suppression motion under advisement until further information
about the possibility of a probable cause hearing could be

presented (R. 122 at 33-42).

The court requested a transcript of

any probable cause hearing held for defendant and the court file
for the school burglary case.

After receiving the court file,

but without receiving a transcript, the court entered its ruling
(R. at 30-36).

The court acknowledged the testimony of Detective

Hutchison that defendant had said that he had been to court and
that an attorney had been appointed (R. at 31 and 35). The court
ruled, however, that an actual court appearance prior to the
questioning on April 7 could not have happened.

The court said:

The Court recognizes that the detective who
interrogated the defendant testified that on
April 7, the defendant informed him he had
been to court and an attorney had been
appointed who he had not yet seen. This
could not have possibly happened, since the
court records indicate clearly that neither
case was filed at the time of or prior to
April 7, and the defendant made no court
appearance according to the files until
April 11. The Court in this decision relies
upon the accuracy of the official court
files.
(R. at 35). The court thus found from official court records
that the probable cause hearing was not held prior to
interrogation on April 7.
For this Court to determine that the probable cause
hearing was held prior to April 7, it must find that the trial
court's finding was clearly erroneous.

State v. Griffin, 754

P.2d 965, 968 (Utah App. 1988).

Nothing in the record indicates

that the finding was erroneous.

There is no proof that the

hearing was held; there is only Detective Hutchison's testimony
that he believed that defendant said that he had been to court.
Even that statement is not sufficient to negate the official file
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in the school burglary case and support a decision that the trial
court's opposite finding is clearly erroneous.
If this Court were to find that the trial court erred
and the hearing had occurred, the issue becomes whether defendant
asked for counsel at that hearing.

The record is silent as to

whether defendant actually asked for counsel. As the trial court
stated in its ruling:
If, in fact, the hearing had occurred prior
to April 7, whether or not Christofferson
invoked his Sixth Amendment rights would
depend upon what was said at the hearing. If
the defendant had stated that he did not have
an attorney and requested that one be
appointed, that would constitute an
invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. If the defendant made no request
for counsel, and the Court noting he did not
have one simply appointed the Legal Defenders
Office to represent him that, in this Court's
view, would not constitute an invocation of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
(R. at 35-36).

The record in this case is simply insufficient to

determine whether defendant asked for counsel at a probable cause
hearing.

Defendant never testified as to whether he asked for

counsel, and none of the other witnesses were present at a prestatement probable cause hearing, nor were they able to testify
about a counsel request.

State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah

1986).
Defendant appears to assert that his mere appearance at
a probable cause hearing was an invocation of his right to have
counsel present at custodial interrogation (Br. of App. at 11,
n. 1 and 13). There is nothing in the record to support this
assertion.

The cases which defendant cites for this proposition

do not support a ruling that mere appearance is an invocation.

Edwards v. Arizona/ 451 U.S. 477 (1981), involved a request for
counsel made directly to police officers while defendant was in
custody but before he was taken before a magistrate.

Again, in

Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S.Ct. 2093 (1988), no mention was made
of whether defendant had been to court and requested counsel
because the counsel request had been made directly to the
officers.

The court in Cervi v. Kemp, 855 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.

1988) cert, denied, 109 S.Ct. 1172, made it clear that the record
below had demonstrated that the defendant had been asked at
arraignment if he wanted counsel and he had said yes.

Both

United States ex. rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117 (7th
Cir. 1987) cert, denied, 483 U.S. 1010, and Michigan v. Jackson,
475 U.S. 625 (1986), involved cases in which the record clearly
demonstrated that the defendants had been arraigned and requested
counsel.

Finally, Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987),

was another situation in which the request for counsel was made
directly to the police prior to arraignment.

None of these cases

fit the present case wherein the record is clear that defendant
had not been arraigned prior to the April 7 interrogation and
there is no record that defendant asked for counsel at a probable
cause hearing.
C.

Defendant Waived His Right to Have Counsel Present
During Questioning.

Accepting the trial court's ruling that the probable
cause hearing did not occur prior to April 7, the issue becomes
whether defendant either invoked or waived his right to have
counsel present during questioning on April 7.

Such an

invocation would rest on defendant's Fifth Amendment right

against self-incrimination and could be waived after proper
Miranda admonition.

That right to the presence of counsel was

validly waived as the trial court found after the suppression
hearing (R. at 35)•
On April 7, defendant was interrogated about his
involvement in the compressor theft.

At the suppression hearing,

Detective Hutchison testified that defendant said that he thought
counsel had been appointed for him.

Accepting, as it appears the

trial court did, that the statement was made, it did not
constitute an unequivocal invocation of his right to have counsel
present during questioning.

At most, it would have been an

equivocal invocation of counsel, a point which will be addressed
below.
Assuming, at this point, for the sake of argument that
defendant's statement was an equivocal invocation, State v.
Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1988), allows an officer to
clarify that equivocation.

To address the question of whether

this "equivocal" invocation was clarified, it is important to
look to the record.

Contrary to the assertions of defendant in

his brief (Br. of App. at 14), the record does not demonstrate
that the Miranda warnings were given and then defendant made his
statement about the appointment of counsel.
demonstrates exactly the opposite.

In fact, the record

The statement was made at a

time when Detective Christensen was not in the room (T. 123 at
66).

In response to cross-examination at trial, Christensen said

that defendant did not say anything about having counsel while
Christensen was there.

Neither did Hutchison tell Christensen

about any mention of counsel until Hutchison testified to that
effect at the suppression hearing (R. 123 at 66). The statement
was made before Christensen entered the room and before defendant
was given the Miranda warnings.

Christensen testified that he

did not personally give the admonitions to defendant but that he
was present when Hutchison gave them (R. 123 at 59). Defendant
does not claim that he was not given the warnings.

When

defendant was advised of his right to have counsel present, "[h]e
indicated he would talk to me [Christensen] at that time without
an attorney present." (R. 123 at 59). If defendant equivocally
invoked his right to have counsel present before Christensen
entered the room (the only time he could have done it), that
invocation was clarified and waived when defendant was given the
Miranda admonitions and told the detectives he would talk to them
without an attorney present.

Because of a sparse record, it is

unknown whether Hutchison asked defendant any other clarifying
questions.
This is different from the case of State v. Griffin,
754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1988).

In Griffin, the defendant was

advised of the Miranda rights, which he waived.

He then was

questioned and, during the interview, said, "This is a lie.

I'm

calling an attorney." 754 P.2d at 966. The detective in that
case then clarified that statement and Griffin said that he did
not want counsel at that point but would continue talking.

754

P.2d at 966-67. This Court held that the clarification was
appropriate and the statement was not taken in violation of
Griffin's right to have counsel present (but reversed when it
found that the statement was coerced).

754 P.2d at 969-71.

In the present case, the equivocal invocation of right
to have counsel present occurred before the Miranda warnings were
given.

The warnings themselves are a stronger clarification than

if the detectives had asked what he meant.

By admonishing him

completely about his right to have counsel present, then asking
if he understood those rights and was willing to speak, the
detectives clarified any ambiguity about defendant's
"invocation".

As the trial court found, defendant was fully

advised of his right to have counsel present and waived that
right knowingly and intelligently and without coercion.

He never

invoked the right even equivocally after being admonished (R. 123
at 59 and R. 122 at 9-10).
D. Defendant's Statement That He Thought Counsel May
Have Been Appointed Was Not An Invocation of His Right
To Have Counsel Present.
Defendant claims that his statement to the officer that
he thought counsel may have been appointed was an equivocal
invocation of the right to have counsel present during
questioning.

This statement was not even an equivocal invocation

of the right which required clarification.
The law is clear that an equivocal request requires
clarification or interpretation; however, if the mention of
counsel is not even an equivocal request, no invocation has
occurred.

The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of

an equivocal request in Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523
(1987).

That case involved a pre-arraignment questioning of a

suspect in a sexual assault.

During custodial interrogation,

Barrett was advised three times of the Miranda warnings prior to

three different interrogations.

Each time, he expressed a

willingness to talk and to answer questions but refused to sign
any written statement without the presence of counsel.

The

Connecticut Supreme Court reversed Barrett's conviction, holding
that "Barrett's expressed desire for counsel before making a
written statement served as an invocation of the right for all
purposes: . . . ". 479 U.S. at 526.

The United States Supreme

Court reversed the Connecticut court, holding that Barrett had
made clear his willingness to talk about the assault and had
limited his invocation of right to counsel to the making of
written statements.

The Court said:

We do not denigrate the "settled approach to
questions of waiver [that] requires us to
give a broad, rather than a narrow,
interpretation to a defendant's request for
counsel," Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,
633 (1986), when we observe that this
approach does little to aid respondent's
cause. Interpretation is only required where
the defendant's words, understood as ordinary
people would understand them, are ambiguous.
Here, however, Barrett made clear his
intentions, and they were honored by police.
To conclude that respondent invoked his right
to counsel for all purposes requires not a
broad interpretation of an ambiguous
statement, but a disregard of the ordinary
meaning of respondent's statement.
479 U.S. at 529-30 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
In a case somewhat analogous to the present one, a
federal circuit court held that showing his attorney's card to
detectives and telling them that he had been told not to make a
statement was not an invocation of the right to have counsel
present.

Quadrini v. Clusen, 864 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1989),

involved a defendant who had a bail hearing on May 19, then
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formal charges were filed the same day and he was arraigned the
next day.

Following the bail hearing, Quadrini was taken to an

office in the sheriff's department.

Quadrini was advised of his

Miranda admonitions and said that he understood them.

He

-specifically replied that he did not want an attorney present
despite the fact that after his court appearance earlier that day
he had been told by an investigator from the public defender's
office that he should not make a statement." 864 F.2d at 579.
Quadrini made incriminating statements to the first officer.
Later in the evening, a second officer entered the
office and was told of the statements.

After the second officer

arrived, Quadrini pulled the business cards of the public
defender and the investigator from his pocket and put them on the
table in front of the officers.

There was no discussion about

the cards but the second officer was told that Quadrini had been
told not to make a statement.

Further questioning occurred and

Quadrini gave a full statement which was admitted at trial.
On appeal, Quadrini claimed that showing the business
card of the public defender and telling the officer's that he had
been advised not to make a statement were an invocation of his
right to have counsel present.

The state courts ruled that this

was insufficient to invoke the right.

"Moreover, both reviewing

courts found that in addition to informing Norlander and Andrekus
of the investigator's advice, Quadrini unequivocally and in clear
and unambiguous terms stated that he did not want an attorney
present."

864 F.2d at 582 (footnote omitted).

The Seventh

Circuit Court reviewed the state court rulings and upheld the

conviction.

The circuit court agreed that Quadrini's actions and

statements were not an invocation and agreed that his statements
were not coerced and were admissible.
In the present case, defendant's statement that he
thought counsel had been appointed was not an ambiguous statement
that should be construed as a request for counsel.

Taking

defendant's words, "understood as ordinary people would
understand them", 479 U.S. at 523, they are nothing more than a
statement of belief that counsel may have been appointed.

There

is no implication that they include a request that that counsel
be present before questioning.

They are similar to Quadrini

pulling out the public defender's card.

Quadrini's statement

that an investigator for the public defender had said not to make
a statement is closer to an expression that counsel is requested
that is defendant's statement in the present case.

Just as in

Quadrini and Barrett, this Court should find that there was no
express or equivocal request for counsel in this case.
A review of the case law cited by defendant
demonstrates that those cases do involve equivocal invocations
but that they are distinguishable from the statement by defendant
in the present case.
lie.

In Griffin, the defendant said "This is a

I'm going to talk to an attorney." 754 P.2d at 968. In

Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984), the Supreme Court found
that Smith had clearly asserted the right by saying "Yeah, I'd
like an attorney present," but then equivocated when the officer
continued questioning.

The express assertion triggered Miranda

and further questioning which lead to the equivocation was
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impermissible.

In State v. Moulds, 105 Idaho 880, 673 P.2d 1074

(Idaho App. 1983), defendant said, "Maybe I need an attorney0 or
"I think I need an attorney."

In Thompson v. Wainright, 601 F.2d

768 (5th Cir. 1979), Thompson said that he wanted to tell an
attorney first.

In State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113, 477 A.2d 1265

(1984), Wright said, "I won't sign any more deeds [or waivers]
without a lawyer present."

Other examples are contained in pages

15 and 16 of defendant's brief.

All of these cases show an

equivocal invocation but all demonstrate some kind of statement
that the defendants felt that they may have wanted counsel
present.

All of them occurred during or after the giving of the

admonition and required some kind of clarification.
Defendant's statement, on the other hand, did not say
anything that could be construed to mean that he felt he may have
wanted counsel present.

It was merely a statement of belief that

counsel may have been appointed.
POINT II
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE ORAL STATEMENT GIVEN
BY DEFENDANT TO DETECTIVE CHRISTENSEN WAS NOT
A DISCOVERY VIOLATION REQUIRING DISMISSAL.
Defendant next complains that the prosecution did not
disclose to him a statement which he made to Detective
Christensen on April 27, 1988. On April 7, defendant had told
Christensen that he, defendant, had taken the compressor.

He

told Christensen that he had sold it to a person named Paul but
could not remember Paul's last name (R. 123 at 60). Defendant
said that he had taken the compressor by himself at the request
of Paul and had traded the compressor to Paul for drugs (R. 123

at 61-62).

He also gave the address where the compressor was

supposed to be and a source to use in locating Paul's last name
(R. 123 at 62). Using that information, Christensen was able to
arrive at the name of Paul Larson as the one who received the
compressor, but was unable at that point to find and retrieve the
compressor (R. 123 at 62-63).
Nearly three weeks later, on April 27, defendant went
to the Murray Police Station and asked to talk to Detective
Christensen (R. 123 at 62-63).

Defendant told Christensen that

defendant had just come from the Mitchley residence and knew that
the compressor had not been recovered (R. 123 at 63). Defendant
gave further information which allowed Christensen to recover the
compressor at the address originally given by defendant but in a
different unit (R. 123 at 64-65).

Defendant then denied that he

had taken the property from Mitchley and said that Larson was
responsible for the theft (R. 123 at 63). When questioned about
his earlier confession that he had taken the compressor,
defendant
[by Detective Christensen] indicated they had
been, you know, he and Mr. Larson had planned
this together. They had been together in
doing this. He went with him at the time,
but he didn't go with him at the time when
the actual theft occurred.
Q When you say, "he" —
A Mr. Christofferson had told me that he
had told Mr. Larson how to obtain the item,
but he had not gone with him at the time he
obtained it.
(R. 123 at 64). The information about this subsequent
conversation was not in any police report and thus was not given
to defense counsel in the process of discovery (R. 123 at 67-68).

At the close of defense counsel's cross examination of
Detective Christensen, a recess was taken (R. 123 at 70). At the
conclusion of that recess, counsel and defendant met with the
judge without the jury present (R. 123 at 70). At that time,
defense counsel moved to dismiss based on what he claimed was a
failure by the State to provide exculpatory evidence.

Defendant

argued that his April 27 statement was a retraction of his
earlier statement and thus was exculpatory (R. 123 at 77). The
trial court denied the motion, stating:
Apparently, this was information that was not
contained in any of the investigative reports
or in the mind of the prosecutor, he himself,
did not know about it until today.
Apparently, this was some information that
came out during examination of the officer.
(R. 123 at 78).
To analyze this issue, the following recitation of
facts may be helpful.

When defendant took the stand he testified

that he had not told Detective Christensen that he hadn't taken
the compressor.

On direct examination, defendant said:

Q [by Mr. Bradshaw] What did you tell
them [the police]?
A [by defendant] I went and talked to
Det. Christensen and when I went in there I
started talking to him, and I said something
to the effect of Paul Larson, the guy who had
it, and I said something to the effect that
he had something to do with it. And Mr.
Christensen asked me if I was saying I didn't
do it or if I was changing, you know my plea
or whatever. I told him, "No, I am not
saying I didn't do it."
Q What were you saying?
A Well, I told him that I knew where it
was at. That is the point I was trying to
get across to him. I knew where he could get
the stuff back.
(R. 123 at 87). On cross examination, defendant testified:
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Q [by Mr. Walsh] You have heard Det.
Christensen today tell us that you told him
the second time you met with him out at the
Murray Police Department, that you had not
done it but you knew who did?
A [by defendant] Not in them [sic] exact
words.
Q What are the exact words, sir?
A I remember discussing with him. What I
most remember is he asked me — he asked me,
"Exactly now, are you telling me that you
didn't do it?" I said, "No, that is not what
I am telling you."
Q That is not what he testified to here
today, was it?
A No. He said I said I didn't do it, and
I don't think that is exactly what was said,
no.
Q Did you ever tell Det. Hutchison of the
Salt Lake Police Department that, in fact,
you had not stolen the compressor but that
you knew who did?
As [sic] I told him I knew about it. I
can't remember telling him that I didn't do
it. You know, specifically in them [sic]
words.

Q So, you don't remember whether you told
him [Detective Hutchison] that or not?
A No, not in so many words. I told him I
knew of it. When he asked me if I knew of
any other crimes, I told him that I knew of a
compressor that was missing in Murray. I
can't remember if I told him I didn't do it.
I told him I knew of it and possibly knew who
done [sic] it.
Q Were you playing games with him, sir?
A I might have been, yeah.
Q You tell us you might. Were you or
weren't you?
A No, I don't think I was playing games
with him but I didn't want to incriminate
myself right there.
(R. 123 at 93-94).
Defendant had also spoken with the victim about the
theft of the compressor and given statements conflicting with
other statements given to the detectives.

Approximately two

weeks after the compressor was reported missing on February 24,
1988/ defendant spoke with Mitchley by phone and told Mitchley
that he had had nothing to do with the compressor being taken (R.
123 at 21). Again, just a few days before the preliminary
hearing was held, defendant approached Mitchley outside of his
home and said that he had not taken the compressor (R. 123 at
22).

Mitchley testified that, at that meeting just before the

preliminary hearing, Mitchley was not aware that defendant had
confessed to taking the compressor and didn't discuss that with
defendant.

He also testified that he did not tell defendant that

some neighbors had seen defendant take the compressor (R. 123 at
32).
Defendant testified differently, saying that he had not
denied taking the compressor when he spoke with Mitchley by
phone, but had only said that he would talk to him about it when
defendant got back to Utah (R. 123 at 86). Defendant said that,
at the face to face meeting, Mitchley told him that neighbors had
seen defendant take the compressor.

Defendant also said that he

admitted to Mitchley at that meeting that he had committed the
theft (R. 123 at 86).
This information is given in detail as background for
the issues of whether defendant has waived this claim on appeal,
whether a discovery violation did occur and whether, if it did,
it was harmless error.
A.

Defendant Has Waived This Issue on Appeal.

It became clear during trial that defendant had
approached Detective Christensen and given him an oral statement

about which no police report was made (R. 123 at 68). This
testimony came from Detective Christensen on the afternoon of the
first day of trial when he was called as the third witness.
After his testimony, the court recessed and defense counsel
eventually raised the discovery issue during that recess (R. 123
at 77). Defense counsel complained that he had not been informed
about this oral statement before the testimony of Christensen (R.
123 at 77). The prosecutor stated that he had first been made
aware of the statement that morning just before trial commenced
(R. 123 at 78).
Defense counsel did not ask for a continuance or a
mistrial for purposes of preparing to respond to this testimony
of the oral statement.

Counsel only asked for a dismissal of the

charge (R. 123 at 77). The prosecutor responded that he had just
learned about the statement that day himself and argued that the
fact that defendant had given inconsistent statements about his
involvement in the case was well known to defense counsel.

The

prosecution objected that dismissal was too strong a remedy if,
indeed, a discovery violation had occurred (R. 123 at 78).
Defendant did not modify his request but merely submitted it on
his motion to dismiss.

The trial court denied the motion,

stating that it was information not found in any investigative
report and was material made known to the prosecutor only that
first day of trial (R. 123 at 78-79).
By clinging to his motion to dismiss as remedy for an
alleged discovery violation and by failing to object to the
testimony about the oral statement when it was offered, defendant
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has waived his right to appeal this issue.

Rule 16(g) of the

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
If at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention of
the court that a party has failed to comply
with this rule, the court may order such
party to permit the discovery or inspection,
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or
it may enter such other order as it deems
just under the circumstances.
At the juncture at which the information became known, defendant
could have asked for, and the court could have granted, such
relief as was "just under the circumstances."

Defendant could

have mitigated the effect of the testimony by objecting to it
when it was first proffered by Detective Christensen and he
became aware that the statement had not been previously disclosed
to him.

In the alternative, he could have sought a continuance

to allow time for preparation to use the information Detective
Christensen had disclosed or could have asked that it be stricken
from the record or asked for a mistrial.

Counsel did not object

to its introduction nor seek a continuance to prepare to rebut
the testimony nor ask for a mistrial.

By asking only for

dismissal, which would not have been just under the
circumstances, and not raising a timely objection, he has waived
relief under Rule 16(g).

See State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879,

882-83 (Utah 1988).
B.

If a Discovery Violation Did Occur, the Error Was
Harmless.

If this Court does not find that defendant has waived
the discovery issue on appeal, it should find that the error, if
any, was harmless.

Defendant argues that his conviction should

be reversed because he was significantly prejudiced when the
trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

Even if a violation

occurred, defendant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced
thereby.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

denying defendant's motion to dismiss "depends entirely upon a
determination of whether the prosecutor's failure to produce the
requested information resulted in prejudice sufficient to warrant
reversal under [Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a), Utah Code Ann. § 77-3530(a) (1982) ]," the harmless error rule.

State v. Knight, 734

P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987) .
In Knight, the Court thoroughly analyzed the operation
of Rule 30(a) in the context of a discovery violation by the
prosecution (wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory evidence).
It clarified the meaning of its previous interpretations of Rule
30(a) that "an error warrants reversal 'only if a review of the
record persuades the court that without the error there was a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant, '" by holding that "[f]or an error to require
reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict."
P.2d at 919-20 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis in
original).

Under Knight,

when the defendant can make a credible
argument that the prosecutor's errors have
impaired the defense, it is up to the State
to persuade the court that there is no
reasonable likelihood that absent the error,
the outcome of trial would have been more
favorable for the defendant.
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734 P.2d at 921. The State "can meet this burden by showing that
despite the errors, the outcome of trial merits confidence and
there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for
defendant."

734 P.2d at 921.

The first prong of analysis of Rule 30 under Knight is
whether defendant has made a credible argument that the error has
impaired the defense.

On this point, defendant claims that his

defense was greatly impaired by surprise
testimony that Mr. Christofferson had,
according to the police, given a
substantially different statement to the
investigating officer during the course of
the investigation. Mr. Christofferson was
unable to fashion an overall strategy in
coping with the double attack of a damaging
statement and a belatedly revealed retraction
of that statement. His lawyer was also
unable to adequately prepare to cross-examine
the officer, whose testimony undoubtedly
carried a great deal of weight with the jury.
(Br. of App. at 32). This claim might have had merit had not
defendant made other "substantially different" statements to
other witnesses, statements which defense counsel was fully aware
of after discovery and before trial.

Defense counsel knew from

discovery and from the suppression hearing that defendant had
first told the victim that he didn't know anything about the
theft of the compressor.

Then, during the first interview, he

told Detective Hutchison that he knew something about a theft but
not that he had committed the theft.

Then he told Detective

Christensen that he had taken the compressor and given or traded
it to a person named Paul.

Next he told the victim again, just

before the preliminary hearing, that he had not taken the
compressor.

Finally, on April 27, he went to the Murray Police

Station and told Detective Christensen that he hadn't taken the
compressor but had planned the theft with Paul and had shown Paul
where the compressor was.

The victim had testified at

preliminary hearing about the substantially different statements
which defendant had given, so defense counsel was aware of the
other inconsistent statements prior to trial.

Thus, defendant

has not made a credible argument that his defense was imparled by
a "substantially different statement" which he gave.
The second prong of the Knight analysis is a
determination whether, without the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood that there is a more favorable result for defendant.
Here the prosecutor offered the detective's testimony of
defendant's oral statement in his case in chief.

Had defense

counsel objected to its inclusion and the trial court suppressed
it, there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result.
Defendant's earlier statement to the detectives that he took the
compressor and that he acted alone while doing so was still
admissible and was enough to convict defendant.

That inculpatory

statement, coupled with all of the other inconsistent statements
given by defendant to different individuals at various times, are
enough to support the conviction.

Even if the April 27 oral

statement were left out, the result of the trial would have been
the same.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, respondent requests that this
Court affirm defendant's conviction.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY
plasation, was to be deemed prima facie
evidence of guilt, jury did not determine
if explanation was satisfactory; tbey determined whether, on all evidence in the
ease, they were convinced beyond reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt; an explanation may hove been satisfactory to jury
gnd yet defendant found guilty because
other evidence may have, notwithstanding,
convinced them beyond reasonable doubt
of his guilt; explanation may have been
unsatisfactory, and proved, or admittedly
false, and yet jury could acquit because
they were not convinced beyond reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. 8tate v.
Brooks, 101 U. 584, 126 P. 2d 1044.

76-6-404

Theft out of atate.
Utah court had jurisdiction to try
defendants on charge of grand larceny
where defendants stole car in Texas and
drove it to Utah. Conners v. Turner, 29 U.
(2d) 311, 508 P. 2d 1185.
Uncorroborated explanation of possession.
Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for grand larceny where recently
stolen pistol was found in car in which
defendant was riding and where defendant's claim that he purchased pistol
several months earlier in bar was not supported by either direct or circumstantial
evidence. State v. Pappacostas, 17 U. (2d)
197, 407 P. 2d 576.

76-6-403. Theft—Evidence to support accusation.—Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single offense embracing the separate
offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receiving stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by evidence
that it was committed in any manner specified in sections 76-6-404 through
76-6-410, subject to the power of the court to ensure a fair trial by granting
a continuance or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise.
History: O. 1953, 76-6-403, enacted by
1*1973, ch. 196, §76-3-403; L. 1974, ch. 32,
1*7.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1974 amendment substituted "sections 76-6-404 through 76-6-410" for "sections 76-6-403 through 76-6-411."

Receiving stolen property.
Evidence which establishes receiving
stolen property under section 7G-6-40S is
sufficient to sustain a conviction of theft
without the necessitv of establishing theft
b v taking. State v/Tnvlor, 570 P. 2d 697.
•
*»
•
Collateral References,
Single or separate larceny predicated
npon stealing property from different owners at the same time, 28 A. L. B. 2d 1182.

76-6-404. Theft—Elements.—A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose
to deprive him thereof.
History: O. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by
L. 1973, eh. 196, $ 76-6-404*
Cross-References,
Motor vehicles special anti-theft laws,
41-M05 to 4M-121.
Shoplifting Act, 78-11-14 et seq.
Comment of defendant'! alienee.
Where defendant charged with theft of
building materials from construction aite
did not testify in his own defense and
offered no evidence to explain his latenight presence at the site, prosecutor's
comment that: "The defense has presented
no evidence as to why defendant was out
there. What was he doing out there f" was

a legitimate comment on what the total
evidence did or did not show; it was not
impermissible comment on defendant's
failure to testify. State v. Kazda, 540 P.
2d 949.
Elements of offense.
State is not required to prove conclusively who the real owner of the property
is, but only that the defendant obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the
propertv of another. State v. 8immons»
573 P. *2d 341.
Evidence establishing theft
Evidenco which establishes the receiving of stolen property under section 70-0-
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AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
AMENDMENT U
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
AMENDMENT i n
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMEND. XII

AMENDMENT VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VII
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
AMENDMENT IX
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
AMENDMENT X
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.
The first ten Amendments were proposed by the first Congress and were ratified
as follows: New Jersey, Nov. 20, 1789; Maryland, Dec. 19, 1789; North Carolina,
Dec. 22, 1789; 8outh Carolina, Jan. 19, 1790; New Hampshire, Jan. 25, 1790; Delaware.
Jan. 28, 1790; Pennsylvania, Mar. 10, 1790; New York, March 27, 1790; Rhode Island,
June 15, 1790; Vermont, Nov. 3, 1791; Virginia, Dec. 15, 1791. Connecticut, Georgia
and Massachusetts ratified them on April 19, 1939, March 18, 1939 and March 2, 1939,
respectively.

AMENDMENT XI
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
History: Proposed by Congress on Sep- fied by the legislatures of three-fourths
tember 5, 1794; declared to have been rati- of all the states on January 8, 1798.

AMENDMENT XII
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot
for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an
19

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 16

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 443.
Victims Have Rights Too, 1986 Utah L. Rev.
449.
Note, Videotaping the Testimony of an
Abused Child: Necessary Protection for the

Child or Unwarranted Compromise of the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 1986 Utah L.
Rev. 461
A.L.R. — Closed-circuit television witness
examination, 61 A.L.R.4th 1155.

Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
<4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of
the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and
places.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
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(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions,
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings,
and other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable
intrusion;
(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the
time of the alleged offense.
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and
shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropriate.
(77-35-16, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1.)
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Discretion of court
A trial court is allowed broad discretion in
granting or refusing discovery and inspection,
and its determinations on this subject will not
be overturned on appeal unless the court has
abused its discretion. State v. Knill, 656 P.2d
1026 (Utah 1982); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d
1187 (Utah 1984).

ANALYSIS

In general.
Continuing duty to disclose.
Discretion of court.
Failure to request discovery.
Nondisclosure.
—No violation of rule.
Physical evidence.
—Stolen property.
Required disclosure.
—State.
Voluntary prosecutorial response.
Witnesses.
Cited.
In general
Discovery powers are conferred upon both
the circuit courts and the district courts. State
v. Easthope, 668 P.2d 528 (Utah 1983).
Continuing duty to disclose.
Even if there is no court-ordered disclosure,
a prosecutor's failure to disclose newly discovered inculpatory information which falls
within the ambit of Subdivision (a), afler the
prosecution has made a voluntary disclosure of
evidence, might so mislead a defendant as to
cause prejudicial error. State v. Carter, 707
P 2d 656 (Utah 1985); State v. Knight, 734
P.2d 913 (Utah 1987).

Failure to request discovery.
The defendant's claim that the prosecutor's
failure to provide him with a police report describing a witness' testimony prior to trial was
not entertained, no request for discovery', written or oral, being made at any time. State v.
Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985).
Nondisclosure.
—No violation of rule.
State's failure to disclose to defendant before
trial certain jail records which corroborated defendant's testimony that he requested medical
treatment while in jail did not violate defendant's discovery rights where there was no
showing in record from which it could be fairly
inferred that prosecution knew or should have
known that defendant's request for medical
treatment would ever be an issue or of any importance at trial. State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d 751
(Utah 1984).
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cretion in refusing to allow a change of venue.
State v. Smith, 11 Utah 2d 287, 358 P.2d 342
(1961).
A bare allegation of prejudice in the county
is patently inadequate to justify a change of
venue. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (2d case)
(Utah), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S. Ct.
341. 74 L Ed. 2d 383 (1982).
Defendant failed in his burden of proving
that a fair and impartial trial could not be had
in the county where the action was tried, and
was therefore not entitled to a change of venue,
where his motion for a change of venue was
supported only by his counsels affidavit to
which was attached a single newspaper article
reporting the victim's father's gratitude for the
manner in which victim's family had been
taken care of by local authorities, and which
reported a short and accurate account of a few
of the basic facts of crime, including the names
of the two persons who had been charged, such
supporting evidence was a mere allegation of
prejudice in the county and was not adequate
to justify a change of venue. State v. Wood, 648
P.2d 71 (2d case), cert denied, 459 U.S. 988,
103 S. Ct. 341, 74 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1982).
Motion for a change of venue and the documents supporting the motion failed to show
that the community atmosphere was sufficiently inflammatory that the jurors' assurances of impartiality should have been disre-

Rule 30

garded, even though some of the jurors had expressed an opinion that defendant was guilty
State v Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988'.
Defendant was not entitled to a change of
venue where pretrial publicity and community
sentiment was not so prejudicial as to lead inevitably to an unfair trial; to prevail on appeal.
defendant must demonstrate that the trial was
not fundamentally fair. State v. Bishop. 753
P.2d 439 (Utah 1988'
Factors to be considered in determining the
potential for prejudice from pretrial publicity
include (1) the standing of the victim and the
accused in the community; (2> the size of the
community; (3) the nature and gravity of the
offense, and (4) the nature and extent of publicity. State v. James, 99 Utah Adv. Rep 14
(1989).
Disqualification of judge.
A judge should recuse himself where there is
a colorable claim of bias or prejudice; even under such circumstances, however, absent a
showing of actual bias or an abuse of discretion, failure to recuse does not constitute reversible error as long as the requirements of
this rule are met. State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d
1091 (Utah 1988)
A judge who has had previous contact with a
defendant on a totally unrelated matter is not
per se disqualified. State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d
1091 (Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law § 372 et seq.
C.J.S. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law §§ 186 to
222.
AJLR. — Pretrial publicity in criminal case
as ground for change of venue, 33 A L R.3d 17.
Change of venue by state in criminal case,
46 A.L.R.3d 295.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding venue and recusation matters, 7 A.L.R.4th 942.
Disqualification of judge because of political
association or relation to attorney in case, 65
A.L.R.4th 73.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *=» 115 to
145.

Rule 30. Errors and defects.
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by
the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order.
(77-35-30, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1.)
Cross-References. — Arraignment, necessity of objection to preserve error, § 77-35-10.

Indictments and informations,
errors, § 77-35-4.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. CR-88-768

WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON,
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress came on for hearing on July
11,

1988,

at

which

time

testimony

was

received

along with

authorities relied upon by the parties, and the Court took the
matter under advisement.

The Court requested that counsel submit

to the Court a transcript of the tape of the hearing before the
Circuit Court, as well as the file in the case related to this
matter.

The Court has received the file, but not the transcript.

However, based upon the files and testimony received, the Court
can make its ruling without benefit of the transcript of the
Circuit Court hearing.
Defendant moves to suppress a statement he gave to the
police concerning theft of a compressor while being interrogated
concerning

a burglary.

He claims that his rights to legal

counsel under the Sixth Amendment had been invoked, as well as

STATE V. CHRISTOFFERSON

his

rights

to

remain

PAGE TWO

silent

and

RULING ON MOTION

to

counsel

under

the

Fifth

Amendment.
At

the

hearing,

Officer

interviewed the defendant
Salt

Hutchison

testified

that

he

the M e t r o p o l i t a n Hall of Justice in

t a k i» r i f; y o r i A11 r I I

1, I ri r e g a r d s t o t h e b u 2: g 1 a i ; o f a

school that had occurred the day b e f o r e .

Defendant w a s read his

Miranda

concerning

rights,

and

answered

questions

the

school

w e r e any other crimes he would like to clear up, and he stated
that h e knew w h o took an air compressor in an unrelated crime.
Defendant w a s then booked.
The

following

day,

on

April

7,

1988,

Hutchison,

with

a

A 3a I:i 1, 1 1 1 s

Murray City Detec11 ve, aga I i i i ntei: vi ewed de f enda:nt

Miranda rights were read to him, and he was questioned concerning
the theft of the ai1: compressor.

Hutchison testified that the

had been appointed for him in regards to the Edison school crime,
but that he had not yet seen that attorney.
st a I v 11

"in

w 1 J I 1 mi 1 j 11t 'I H N

I

n 111 H m (- r

Defendant

11 u e s t i o n s

further

c o n c e r r 111111

compressor crime, and at nc time did he invoke his Miranda rights
to remain silent or to answer no further questions without advice
of counsel
time,

invoked

. #
his

.
Miranda

,&

*-

rights,

~
nor

* . **
did

^-

counsel, or to refrain from answering questions until he had

«
legal

D

th e
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consulted

legal
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counsel.

In
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fact,

he

testified

of

his

willingness to talk without benefit of counsel.
Defend in in l

legal counsel, that
regards

to

tat once he had been appointed

IAVI'N

1 ICI

further

inter r oga1101 m

rights that he could not waive in

interrogation

unless

he

in 11 i a t eill

such

Defendant relies upon U.S. Ex Rel. Espinoza v.

Fairman> 813 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1987), and Arizona v. Roberson,
an unpublished United States Supreme '"ourt decision, decided June
15, 1988,
The law

stated

case before t

-

both decisions

—

is applicable in the

U.S. Ex Rel. Espinoza v. Fairman,

supra, the court stated:
The Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment each
provide a separate right to counsel in a criminal case.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person. . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. , "
Although the amendment itself
does not speak of the right to counsel, the Supreme
Court held in Miranda v. Arizona. . . that it provides
"an individual held for interrogation. . . the right to
consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him
during interrogation. . . ."
In addition, the Sixth
Amendment
guarantee
that M [ i ] n
all
criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. , , to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
Espinoza
-----questioned

concerning

case,
during
a

Espinoza

had

interrogation

murder.

charge, he had invoked the right: to

been

arrested

of, that

regards

to

crime
the

o in a
was

weapons

sell, under the Sixth

->

STATE V.

CHRISTOFFERSON

Amendment.

PACE FOUR

KUX.ING

(IN

MO'I H)N

N o such right was, or could have been made, in

regards to the murder charge since the State had not yet filed
charges « ^ r begur

to prosecute hln In thai, natter.

The above

court stated:
Although Espinoza had no Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in the murder case at the time of the police
interrogation, it is clear that, as a suspect in police
custody, he did have a Fifth Amendment right to be
assisted by an attorney at the interrogation. However,
Espinoza did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right at
the interrogation. The only time at which he invoked
h i s constitutional right to counsel w a s at his
arraignment on the weapons charge, which occurred prior
to the murder interrogation.
W e must therefore
determine whether Espinoza 1 s invocation of his right to
counsel at his arraignment constituted an invocation of
his Fifth Amendment right.
If it did, w e must next
decide whether Espinoza's Fifth Amendment invocation
remained
in e f f e c t a t t h e s u b s e q u e n t
police
interrogation on the murder charge.
If so, we must
resolve whether Espinoza waived his Fifth Amendment
right to counsel at the interrogation.
We conclude that Espinoza invoked his Fifth
Amendment right to counsel; that this invocation
remained in effect because the custodial interrogation
o c c u r r e d w h i l e he remained in continuous police
custody; and that because the State initiated the
interrogation, Espinoza was incapable of waiving his
right to counsel. 1 We therefore conclude that the State
violated Espinoza s Fifth Amendment right to counsel
and that, as a result, his confession was inadmissible.
Tit 1 * f I mi i 1

I 1 k c w 1 Be (l 11 r 11 ds t hat 1 f

In fart „ Christof f erson

had invoked his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment in
regards to the burglary of the Edison school case, in \ct , r i g h t w a s
his

««1ujrii'i«i

f

he interrogation in this matter, not only of the

Edison school case, but of the compressor theft case. The
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interrogation
custody,

occurred

PAGE PIVE

while

he
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remained

iii continuous

the State initiated the interrogation and,
is

rlrjht- fo

police

therefore,

counsel

without

counsel being present.
If Christofferson had not invoked his right to legal cc unsel
under

the Sixth Amendment,

he still had his rights under

the

Fifth Amendment which could be waived.
A review of £ t ate v. Christofferson, CR 88 • £»52 , t.he si:hoo 1
burglary case, the Court file indicates that the Complaint

was

filed on April

the

8,

19 88, and a Summons dated that date of

warrant of at rest

"The defendant

appear ed without counsel

for

arraignment in Circuit Curt on April 1] , 1988, at: which time the
court

appointed

de f e nda n t

the

Legal

Defenders

office

to

represent

the

A t; t o r ne y Bradshaw f i I ed his appearance on Apri 1 12 ,

1988, and the preliminary hearing held on April 13, 1988.
There fore, the inter rogat ion by t he S a ] t I a y .e C i t .y Pc:> ] I ce,
as wei,l a» trie Murray Poli ce, apparently occurred prior to the
Complaint

being

filed,

and prior

to defendant's

appearance

in

court without counsel, at which time legal counsel was appointed,
This

being

the case,

and

since

the Sixth Amendment

right

to

counsel does not attach until the State begins its prosecution,
and

since the case

involving

theft

of

the

compressor

wa,ti not

filed until April 13, 1988, the police had a right to question

\
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Christ, or fei son as long as he had been advised of his Miranda
rights and he had effectively waived the same.
Mr.

C h r i s t o f f e r s o n w a s q l v e in hlii Mliaiidn

right a,

ami did

waive the same, and did voluntarily talk to the police concerning
theft

of

the

compressor.

Therefore,

such

statement

is

admissible.
The defendants Motion to Suppress is, therefore, denied.
The Court recognizes that the detective who interrogated the
defendant

t,i-»st i f leml th^f' r, April

, the defendant informed him

he had been to court and an attorney had been appointed who he
had not yet seen.

This could not have possi bl y happei \ed,

since

t h e court i etords Indicate clearly that neither case was filed at
the time of or prior to April 7, and the defendant made no court
appearance according to the files tint I,] Apr 13 ] 1 • The Coi ir t In
tluib .lee is ion
files.

relies upon the accuracy of the official court

If, in fact, the hearing had occurred prior to April 7,

w h e t h e r o r iiut. C h r i s t o f f e i eon Invoked h i e Sixth A m e n d m e n t
would depend upon what was said at the hearing.

lights

If the defendant

had stated that he did not have an attorney and requested that
one

be appointed,

Sixth Amendment

that

would

const if ut e

right to counsel.

a n 1, nvorat J on

of t h e

If the defendant made no

request for counsel, and the Court noting he did not have one
simply appointed the Legal Defenders Office to represent him
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that, in this Court'• view, would not constitute an invocation of
the Sixth Amendment rigtyt,to_ counsel.
Dated thi .

/

^-—7

ay of July, 1988.
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